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Discriminating Genocide From War Crimes:
Vietnam and Afghanistan Reexamined
HELEN FEIN*
Raphael Lemkin introduced the concept of genocide in 1942 as a way
to understand the objective of Germany's policies toward the population
of the occupied states.1 Historically, this term has been used "to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essen-
tial foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilat-
ing the groups themselves."2 Since 1944, the concept has frequently been
misused rhetorically and metaphorically for political ends. For instance,
segregation and integration, drug addiction and methadone-maintenance,
free choice of abortion and enforced birth control, AIDS, and condom use
each have been labelled as "genocide." ' Despite the prevalence of geno-
cide4 -and the importance of the concept as an international norm, no sat-
isfactory method exists to distinguish putative cases from rhetorical mis-
uses and specious claims.
This article proposes criteria and conditions to be examined in evalu-
ating charges of genocide and to differentiate such charges from war
crimes and other mass killings.
It also illustrates these criteria by applying them to the accusations
of genocide made against the superpowers arising from their interventions
in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan . 5 Before evaluating these cases,
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however, it is necessary to review how the concept of genocide emerged,
how genocide is legally defined, and the problematic situations in which
war and genocide may emerge simultaneously.
I. ORIGINS OF THE LABEL, GENOCIDE
The impetus to recognize genocide as a distinct crime emerged as a
reaction to the systematic mass murder of Jews and Gypsies, and the se-
lective decimation of Poles and Slavic civilians in Nazi-controlled Europe
during World War II. The mass murders of Jews and Gypsies were acts
against intentionally discriminated and aggregated victims - acts not re-
lated to the goals of war as legitimated in international law and already
criminalized by the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. The perpetrators
of these acts were indicted for genocide at Nuremberg, Germany in 1945
and later tried for their crimes against humanity. The foundation for
these indictments was the Hague Convention's prohibition of the murder,
deportation, and enslavement of civilians during war.
6
A subsequent definition of genocide appeared in the United Nations
Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide,
which became effective international law in 1951.' The Genocide Conven-
tion made genocide a crime for which individuals might be indicted,
whether occurring in times of peace or war, and regardless of whether the
victims were nationals of other states or of the perpetrators' own state.
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately in-
flicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring
AND AMERICANS IN VIETNAM 502 (1973); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE (1968); MICHAEL
MACOBY & RICHARD FALK, WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 80-81 (1970). But see
DANIEL ELLSBERG, Contra This, in WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 82-83 (1970).
See also W.V. O'BRIEN, THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES 3; THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 198-199 (Richard Falk ed., 1972); HUGO ADAM BEDAU, Genocide in Vietnam?, in
PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974).
For Afghanistan: See JAN GOODWIN, The Media Ignores Genocide in Afghanistan, 2
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988); Report of the Independent Counsel on
International Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, 42 U.N.
GAOR C.3 (Agenda Item 12) U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/8 (1987), edited and reprinted in W.M.
REISMAN AND C.H. NORCHI, Genocide and the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, 4 INST.
FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988). But see BARNETT R. RUBIN, Afghanistan: Over
a Million Dead, 7 INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988).
6. SEE BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY REC-
ORD 1944-45 (1982).
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1951 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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children of the group to another group 8
The General Assembly first passed a resolution condemning genocide
as a crime on 11 December 1948, stating that "[g]enocide is a denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of
the right to live of individual human beings."9 Kuper notes that "the
crime of genocide in this resolution is wholly independent of crimes
against peace or of war crimes."1 0
Discriminating among mass and arbitrary killings that are genocides
under the Genocide Convention definition, killings that can be considered
war crimes, and unintended killings that are ascribable to the effects of
war itself may present problems. In order to distinguish genocide from
civilian deaths resulting from warfare or war crimes, I suggest a paradigm
to clarify the pattern, authorization, context, and intent of such acts. This
paradigm will then be employed to evaluate the substantive case for
charges of genocide against the United States in Vietnam (1963-1973) and
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979-1988).
Since the claims of genocide in Vietnam and Afghanistan arose in the
context of wars, certain definitional issues need to be clarified. "War is a
'legal condition which equally permits two or more groups to carry on a
conflict by armed force.' , Thus, war is ideally conceived of as a sym-
metrical conflict between two forces. By contrast, genocide is usually con-
ceived of as the asymmetrical slaughter of an unorganized group by an
organized force.
Although the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide 2 is the
international norm, scholars of genocide have offered more encompassing
definitions that include all groups, based on the concept of the defense-
less victim. "Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to
physically destroy a group directly or indirectly, through interdiction of
the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained re-
gardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim."" "Ge-
nocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other au-
thority intends to destroy a group."4 Marginal cases involving genocide
include the Warsaw ghetto uprising and the 1915 Armenian defense of
Van, memorialized in "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.' 5 In these cases,
the victims knew they would be killed if they did not resist, so despite
8. Id.
9. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 23 (1981).
10. Id. at 23.
11. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MODEL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 41 (1977), quoting QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 8 (1942).
12. See Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
13. Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, 24 CURRENT SOC. 38 (1990); see
also HELEN FEIN, GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1993).
14. FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 23
(1990).
15. FRANZ WERFEL, THE FORTY DAYS OF MUSA DAGH (Geoffrey Dunlop Trans., 1934).
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being poorly armed or unarmed, they fought in order to live or die
fighting.
In wars fought according to international law, combatants are limited
by what Walzer calls the "war convention."16 Although the "war conven-
tion" was codified by both the Hague and Geneva Conventions in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it cross-cuts many cultures and his-
torical periods.17 Similarly, Singh and McWhinney relate the sources of
the "war convention" to the major world religions: Christianity, Hindu-
ism, and Islam. 8 This is not to say that the "war convention" has been
observed throughout this period but that the ideal transcends particular
cultures and time.
The functions of the "war convention" are twofold: justifying war as
a human institution by establishing criteria for evaluation of specific
wars, and limiting the effects of war. These functions enable people to
both make and conclude wars. International humanitarian law, which em-
bodies the "war convention," prohibits the following: 9
1) killing or wounding captured or surrendered prisoners;
2) not distinguishing non-combatants from combatants in waging in-
discriminate attacks leading to the killing, wounding, or violating the
rights of civilians intentionally;
3) inflicting foreseeable injury to civilians "out of proportion to the
military advantage reasonably expected to be gained"; 0 and,
4) certain means of warfare, such as poison gas and chemical
weapons."
These criteria can lead to justifications for killing civilians. Both
"military necessity" and "proportionality" are flexible notions. The "prin-
ciple of double effect," initially "worked out by Catholic casuists in the
Middle Ages," is a sophisticated justification for foreseeable, but un-
wanted, civilian deaths that arise from pursuit of necessary military
objectives.2"
Walzer illustrates three types of situations involving pre-modern and
modern warfare that have resulted in mass death of civilians. These situa-
tions, which have been labeled genocidal by some, undermine the view
that war and genocide are always discrete phenomena. The first situation
16. WALZER, supra note 11, at 44.
17. Walzer discussed this in a lecture on "Minimalism in Ethics" at the John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government of Harvard University, February 25, 1991.
18. J. NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD McWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed., 1989).
19. See generally HILAIRE McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1990);
WALZER, supra note 11.
20. WALDEMAR A. SOLF & W. GEORGE GRANDISON, International Humanitarian Law
Applied in Armed Conflict, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 583 (1979)(adding the proportionality
element). See also DAVID WEISSBRODT & BETH ANDRUS, The Right to Life During Armed
Conflict: Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, 29 HARV INT'L L. J. 71 (1988).
21. MCCOUBREY, supra note 19.
22. WALZER, supra note 11, at 152-153.
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involves war or phases of wars in which one side relies on a strategy of
attrition, such as tactical sieges and blockades.
2
The second situation involves guerilla wars in which a rebel force
tries to undermine state power, and the state undertakes the elimination
of the guerilla force.24 In so doing, the state indiscriminately kills large
numbers of the ethnic or regional group from which the guerrillas are
drawn, since the guerrillas are not readily distinguishable from innocent
civilians. Is this situation an inevitable result of the ambiguity, or are
these indeed genocidal massacres? Kuper, Fein, and other scholars em-
ploy the term "genocidal massacre" to define massacres that are not part
of a continuous genocide but are committed by an authority or other or-
ganized group against a particular ethnic or other distinguishable group.2 5
These "genocidal massacres" are organized to destroy victims selected on
the basis of their identity alone and have been labeled pogroms, race ri-
ots, and communal violence.
The third situation involves total war, distinguished from a guerilla
action by the use of weapons of mass devastation such as aerial bombard-
ment with conventional or nuclear weapons. Some charge that targeting
civilian populations with nuclear or other weapons, resulting in the killing
of great numbers indiscriminately, is intrinsically an act of genocide.2
The types of situations in which genocide arises are not original to
modern times. The first situation, encompassing blockades and encircled
sites, has reoccurred throughout history. Typically, a city was seized or
blockaded until its inhabitants surrendered. According to Walzer, neither
siege nor blockades of civilian populations is prohibited by the rules of
war when soldiers are fighting from within villages and cities inhabited or
surrounded by civilians. In ancient and modern times, the number of ci-
vilians killed in such cases has been enormous. The Geneva Protocols of
1977, however, outlawed the starvation of civilians in the time of war.
Deliberate famines were imposed as a means of genocide in the So-
viet Ukraine in 1932-33, the Warsaw Ghetto in 1941-42, and in other Jew-
ish concentrated areas during the Holocaust.2 7 These cases can be distin-
23. Id. at 160-74. Since the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which must have
occurred subsequent to the printing of Walzer, all "methods of warfare designed to take
effect through starvation of the civilian population are prohibited," according to Mc-
COUBREY, supra note 19, at 117. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE RED CROSS,*
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 653-54, 943, 1330, 1457 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS].
24. Id. at 176-96.
25. KUPER, supra note 9, at 9; HELEN FEIN, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide
and Critical Responses, in TOWARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE: 2
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE 31
(Israel W. Charney ed., 1984).
26. KUPER, supra note 9, at 14, 17, 34-35, 45-46, 50, 55, 91-92, 102, 139, 174; ISRAEL
CHARNY, GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 7-8 (Israel Charny ed., 1988).
27. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Report to Congress (1988); HELEN FEIN, Ac-
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guished from other historical governmentally imposed famines since the
military objectives were not designed to compel one side to surrender.
Reprisals are also permissible actions that may lead to the deaths of
many civilians. Belligerent forces may conduct reprisals against civilians
to punish and deter crimes of the opposing force, including violations of
the "war convention." Walzer explains that
[n]o part of the war convention is so open to abuse, is so openly
abused, as the doctrine of reprisals .... It legitimizes actions other-
wise criminal, if these actions are undertaken in response to crimes
previously committed by the enemy ... Reprisals of this sort have as
their purpose the enforcement of the war convention .... Under the
special conditions of combat, at least, utilitarian calculations have in-
deed required the 'punishing' of innocent people.2 8
Reprisals are also subject to the criteria of proportionality. This led to the
severe condemnation, and subsequent indictment, of Nazi officers for the
killings of hostages in occupied countries during World War 11.29
Guerilla warfare presents another complicated series of challenges to
the "war convention." How can both sides fight effectively with disparate
means and at the same time respect the distinction between combatants
and noncombatants? How do observers assess the responsibility of the
guerrillas and the defenders of the state to protect the uninvolved citizens
from reprisals? For
the guerrillas don't subvert the war convention by themselves attack-
ing civilians; at least, it is not a necessary feature of their struggle that
they do that. Instead, they invite their enemies to do it .... [T]hey
seek to place the onus of indiscriminate warfare on the opposing
army. The guerrillas themselves have to discriminate, if only to prove
that they really are soldiers (and not enemies) of the people.
3 0
The killing of non-combatants often occurs in contexts where it is
not readily possible for soldiers to distinguish between partisans and ci-
vilians, such as instances when non-uniformed partisans fight from the
midst of civilian villages. In some cases, such killing is a result of confu-
sion; in other cases, the arbitrary killings are simply rationalized by gov-
ernment forces because of their inability to identify partisans. Some gue-
rilla forces use calculated killings of class enemies or indiscriminate
killing as a means of creating terror, thus gaining power over the
civilians."1
COUNTING FOR GENOCIDE: NATIONAL RESPONSES AND JEWISH VICTIMIZATION DURING THE HOLO-
CAUST 210 (1979).
28. WALZER, supra note 11, at 207-210.
29. Id. at 211; GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 294 (1980).
30. WALZER, supra note 11, at 180.
31. HELEN FEIN, LIvEs AT RISK 25-27 (Institute for the Study of Genocide, 1990). For
examples see the Shining Path guerrillas in Peru, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Renamo in
Mozambique, and Sikh terrorists in India.
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Another issue is whether the use of fire power to respond to partisan
attacks and to spare the state forces or intervenors casualties by exploit-
ing their superior weaponry produces indiscriminate killing. If the sides
are divided by ethnicity or nationality, as is often the case in guerilla and
civil wars, a pattern of indiscriminate killing could constitute an attempt
by one party to eliminate the other. Such a pattern of indiscriminate kill-
ing could constitute a disguised attempt to dry up the "sea" of supporters
in which the guerrillas "swim," to use a metaphor by Mao. These charges
have been raised both in civil wars and in interventions. We shall return
to these scenarios when evaluating the charges against the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The possibility that the use of nuclear weapons against civilians con-
stitutes genocide needs to be examined. Most international lawyers who
have considered this issue agree that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal
under the law of war because of the extent of indiscriminate killing- 2 An-
other ground for finding the use of nuclear weapons illegal is the resulting
radiation poisoning of the atmosphere of neutral states.33
Dissenters to this argument include McDougal, Schlei and Stone.34
Further, governments that possess nuclear arms do not agree that use of
those weapons is illegal. Opinions on the legality of tactical nuclear weap-
ons are mixed.3 5 However, some agreement exists on possible legal uses of
nuclear weapons, including nuclear reprisals, destruction of incoming hos-
tile aircraft carrying nuclear missiles, and the possession and stockpiling
of nuclear arms.
Nuclear deterrence, a balance of terror designed to avoid "mutually
assured destruction," raises an issue of the use of immoral threats. Some
scholars who discuss genocide have said or implied that the use or threat
of nuclear weapons leading to mass killing of another national group is
genocidal.3 " Other genocide scholars, including Barbara Harff, Frank
Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, and myself disagree.3 7 Singh and McWhinney
consider nuclear war a violation of the Genocide Convention because of
its effects, although it was not the intent of the Convention to prohibit
32. See SINGH AND MCWHINNEY, supra note 18, at 313-19. Only two of fourteen mem-
bers of the Special Commission of the Institut de Droit International in 1967 considered
the use of weapons of mass destruction permissible. Id. Similarly, the Geneva Conference
Report of experts convened by the Carnegie Endowment in 1969 concluded that atomic,
biological, and chemical weapons were prohibited. Id. at 318.
33. Id. at 80-81, 157-63, 188-89.
34. Id. at 188-89, 301-12, 319.
35. Id. at 146, 171-74, 191-92, 195-99.
36. KUPER, supra note 9, at 17; IAN CLARK, WAGING WAR: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUC-
TION 100 (1988), quoting Fred Charles Ikle; CHARNY, supra note 26, at 7-8.
37. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 14, at 23-25; see also papers by Frank Chalk, Israel
Charny, Helen Fein, and Leo Kuper presented at conference at Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center
for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, February 16, 1991 (forthcoming in GENO-
CIDE: THE CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORIcAL DIMENSIONS (George Andreopolus, ed., 1994)).
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nuclear war."
Analysis of this controversy requires consideration of three questions
regarding the use of nuclear weapons. First, was the use of atomic weap-
ons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 an act of genocide? Second, does
the threat of a nuclear response, building weapons, and calculating nu-
clear strategies (whether mutually assured destruction or counter-force)
violate the prohibition against genocide? Does this question depend on
the intention behind the use of the threat; for example, could a threat
intended to deter war and its resultant casualties be genocidal? Third,
would the use of any nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons, in a
future war, whether in aggression or in self-defense, constitute genocide?
This article cannot fully address these questions, but it can suggest
an approach to answering them. Regarding the question of genocide in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the available evidence suggests that the answer
is no. No one has suggested any evidence to show intent by the Allies to
eliminate the Japanese as a people. Indeed, all allied acts of war ceased
when Japan surrendered. Acts of genocide, by contrast, typically include
the slaughter of people in captivity, people who have surrendered, or peo-
ple without a state or political organization that can offer a credible
threat to the perpetrator. The judgment whether such aerial bombings
were wrong, unnecessary, or violations of the war convention is not the
same as whether they were genocidal. The atom-bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki could be considered a crime of war or a crime against hu-
manity, even though both cities were military centers."' But the evidence
does not support an allegation of genocide.
Regarding the question of nuclear build-ups, the concept of "omni-
cide" appears more appropriate than that of genocide. 0 If a threat made
with the intention to deter actually were to precipitate a nuclear war,
there would be bilateral mass killings, without regard to racial, religious,
national or ethnic identity of the victims and including citizens of each
side in residence on the other side. Such an unprecedented situation can-
not be described by the paradigm of genocide, which presumes a powerful
perpetrator and a relatively powerless victim. Omnicide implies two per-
petrator-victims, reciprocally engaged in mutually assured suicide.
The consideration of hypothetical events and rhetorical claims of ge-
nocide often blurs the perception of present events. It should not be for-
gotten that genocide has reoccurred several times since World War II." If
genocide is not understood and detered or stopped through intervention,
it will certainly occur again. In order to detect emerging genocide, an ex-
amination of past acts of genocide is helpful. The following paradigm
enumerates some general criteria that past acts of genocide had in
38. SINGH AND MCWHINNEY, supra note 18, at 119.
39. Id. at 150-52.
40. CHARNEY, supra note 26, at 7-8.




II. THE GENOCIDE PARADIGM
A. A Paradigm for Detecting and Tracing Genocide
I have culled the elements of a paradigm to detect genocide and to
document its course from studies conducted by myself and by others. The
result is a set of propositions that examine the parameters identifying
how genocide occurred and additional questions that further examine
reinforcing conditions. The following propositions constitute a set of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions to impute genocide. How each proposition
"fits" the facts of a particular case is assessed by answers to the questions
that follow the propositions.
Proposition 1: There is a sustained attack, or continuity of attacks,
by the perpetrator to physically destroy group members, a) Did a series
of actions or a single action of the perpetrator lead to the death of mem-
bers of group X? b) What tactics were used to maximize the number of
victims? Such tactics may include, among other things, preceding regis-
tration, orders to report and round-ups, and the isolation and concentra-
tion of victims. c) What means, besides direct killing, were used to de-
stroy the victims or to interdict the biological and social reproduction of
the group? Actions may include poisoning air or water, imposed starva-
tion, introduction of disease entities, forcible prevention of birth, and in-
voluntary transfer of children. d) What was the duration, the sequence of
actions, and the number of victims? Trace the time span, repetition of
similar or related actions, and the number of victims.
Proposition 2: The perpetrator is a collective or organized actor or a
commander of organized actors. Genocide is distinguished from homicide
empirically by the fact that it is never an act of a single individual. It is
necessary to determine the following: a) Were the perpetrators joined as
an armed force, paramilitary force, or informal band? b) Was there a con-
tinuity of leadership or membership of perpetrators or similar bases of
recruitment for such forces? c) Were these forces authorized or organized
by the state? d) To whom were those forces responsible - an agency of
the state, army, or party? e) Were they organized and garbed to display
or to deny government responsibility?
Proposition 3: The victims are selected because they are members of
a group. a) Were the victims selected irrespective of any charge against
them individually? b) Were they chosen on the basis of a state adminis-
trative designation or their group identity? Criteria for identity include
membership in a religious body, physical differences, linguistic ability, or
other sign of identity. c) Were they chosen on the basis of status within
the group, such as religious leaders or the educated class? d) Was the
basis of the group religion, race, ethnicity, tribal or linguistic status? e)
42. FEIN, supra note 13, at 25-28.
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Were they pre-selected or discriminated from other citizens before the
killings? Evidence of pre-selection includes prior legal definition, denial
of equal rights and entitlement under the law, stripping of citizenship,
civil rights, state posts, licenses, benefits and legal group recognition, seg-
regation and marking, rounding-up and ghettoization or concentration.
Proposition 4: The victims are defenseless or are killed regardless of
whether they surrendered or resisted, a) Was the victims' group armed
and organized to physically resist the perpetrators' group? b) Was their
level of armament sufficient to wage war against the perpetrators? Were
the armaments being used to defend themselves from being seized? c)
Was there evidence, if the victims were armed, that they were killed after
their surrender and that unarmed members of the group were systemati-
cally killed?
Proposition 5: The destruction of group members is undertaken with
intent to kill and the murder is sanctioned by the perpetrators. a) Could
the deaths of group members be explained as accidental outcomes? b)
Was there evidence of repetition of destruction either in design or as a
foreseeable outcome? c) Was there direct evidence of orders or authoriza-
tion for the destruction of the victims? d) At what level did the authori-
zation occur? e) Was there prima facie evidence showing that the authori-
ties had to plan or deliberately choose to overlook a pattern of
destruction? f) Was there any evidence of sanctions against agents re-
sponsible for such acts?
The following two questions examine reinforcing conditions:
Question 1: Consistency of sanctions for killing group members: a)
Were there any rules promulgated by the perpetrator to punish or to ex-
onerate individual murder, torture, and rape of members of the victim
group? b) Were there institutional mechanisms to implement such rules?
c) Were there examples of sanctions enforced for either the murder of
members of the victim's group or the failure to protect victims from at-
tacks by the perpetrators? Were there sanctions for refusing to partici-
pate in killing the victims or for reporting the commission of such
killings?
Question 2: Ideologies and beliefs legitimating genocide: a) Was
there evidence of an ideological, mythical, or articulable social goal justi-
fying destruction of the victim? Can one observe religious traditions of
contempt and collective defamation, stereotypes, and derogatory meta-
phors indicating that the victims were inferior or sub-human? Were the
victims depicted in myth, ideology, or folklore as super-human, Satanic
and/or omnipotent? Were there other signs that the victims were pre-
defined as alien, outside the universe of obligation of the perpetrator,
sub-human or dehumanized, or the enemy, such as rhetoric justifying the
elimination of the victim group in order that the perpetrator may live? b)
If destructive acts were acknowledged by the perpetrator, how were they
labeled and justified? c) Did the acknowledgement, labeling, and justifica-
tion change before different audiences?
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B. Two Putative Like Cases: Analogy Can Mislead
The United States intervention in Vietnam (1963-73) and the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan (1979-88) have both evoked charges of geno-
cide. While the charges against the United States were widely broadcast,
the charges against the Soviet Union garnered little public attention for
two reasons. First, no internal or international campaign to stop the So-
viet Union existed. Second, many in the West professed that Afghanistan
was "the Soviets' Vietnam"; thus, further judgment seemed superfluous.
Even critics of the Soviet Union's invasion generally attributed the prob-
lematic questions of how the war was conducted to the nature of the anti-
guerilla war and the tenacity of the Afghan's resistance.
There is no necessary or logical reason, however, to come to a similar
judgment in both cases because the interventions may not have been sim-
ilarly motivated. In both cases, the intervenor's motives are in dispute.
Did the United States intervene in Vietnam to stop communism under
fear of the "domino" theory, to provide a further application of the use of
low-level warfare by guerilla movements elsewhere, to deter aggression, or
to prevent an ally from falling? Did the Soviet Union intervene in Af-
ghanistan to expand its sphere of influence by aggression, to dominate
Southwest Asia, or to prevent a communist state and ally from falling in
accordance with the Brezhnev doctrine?
I shall not review the evidence here because the underlying rationale
of the intervenors is beyond the scope of this article. Further, the judg-
ment whether either action became genocide does not depend on the
goals of either the United States or the Soviet Union, but it does depend
on the intent and pattern of their uses of force.
I will not address the issue of whether these were just wars, jus ad
bellum, but will instead focus on the questions raised about the conduct
of the war, jus in bello. This does not imply that I condone either inter-
vention - I do not. Rather, it simply recognizes that the assessment of
war crimes and genocide is logically a separate issue from the justness of
the ends of war. Confirmed pacifists who take the position that "there are
no war crimes: war is the crime," as a poster of the War Resistance
League attests, may regard this separation as pointless. On the contrary,
if the war alone is the crime, there is no added onus, nor any restraint, on
any warring party for the murder, rape, torture, or deportations that its
troops inflict, or even for eliminating entire groups at will. Such a posi-
tion does not serve to inhibit war, war crimes, or genocide.
III. THE GENOCIDE PARADIGM APPLIED
The following tables list the specific genocide charges that have been
made against the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Af-
ghanistan. These charges will be individually evaluated using the previ-
ously laid out paradigm.
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TABLE h CHARGES OF GENOCIDE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN
VIETNAM (1968)
AND THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN (1988)
UNGC Clause Violated * Charges made in Charges made in
Acts prohibited in the Vietnam * Afghanistan **
UNGC
1. a) Killing members in massive bombing, free-fire massive bombing,
whole or in part zones unrestricted
"indiscriminate shooting, repeated massacres in
murder, rape, and looting" villages, roads, refugee
caravans; reprisals and
summary executions
b) Causing serious bodily anti-personnel weapons, attacks on religion, mines
or mental harm napalm, fragmentation disguised as toys
bombs
c) Deliberately inflicting defoliation, shooting destruction of food
conditions of life livestock, transferring supplies, irrigation canals
calculated to bring about populations to refugee and wells, depopulation
its physical destruction in camps and hamlets
whole or in part "strategic attacks on
society"
d) Imposing measures to putting South Vietnamese
prevent births within the in refugee camps
group
e) Forcibly transferring forced transfers back to
children of the group to the USSR
another group
2) Was the "intent to YES - Sartre YES - Reisman & Norchi
destroy in whole or in NO - Lewy YES - Goodwin
part, a national . . . group NOT PROVEN - Bedau NO - Rubin
as such" present? OTHER INTENT - Miller
* From the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
•* For charges made by various authors see:
Vietnam: BEDAU, supra note 5; LEwY, infra note 43; MILLER, infra note 70; SARTRE,
supra note 5.
Afghanistan: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, infra note 120; GOODWIN, supra note 5; HELSINKI
WATCH 1984, infra note 116; HELSINKI WATCH 1985, infra note 116; LABER & RUBIN, infra
note 116; REISMAN & NORCHI, infra note 5; RUBIN, supra note 5; SLIWINSKU, infra note 136.
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Estimates of Effects Vietnam Afghanistan
% civilians killed 1.7% **
% of total national group 3.6% * 9% *
killed
% refugees in other 33%
countries I
*** LEWY, infra note 43, at 301; percentages based on the 1965 population figures from
The UNITED NATIONS DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK (1974), cited by LEWY, supra at 301.
**** Sliwinski, a demographer, makes estimates based on a "representative sampling of
Afghan families inhabiting Pakistan's 318 refugee camps in August 1987 and based on the
prewar Afghan population. The USCR estimates that 40% of Afghans were refugees and
15% were internally displaced in 1988 (United States Committee for Refugees, World Refu-
gee Survey: 1988 in Review (Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1989).
Note: The reader may observe that the estimate of losses in Afghanistan is based on an
actual survey of Afghans while that in Vietnam is based on American estimates of war dead.
In order to compare the depopulation of Vietnam that might be attributed to the war with
that of Afghanistan, I calculated the difference between the expected population in 1973
(based on the annual rate of increase in 1957) and the actual population, expecting that the
deficit could be attributed to war deaths. However, the 1973 population was 2,365,144
greater than that expected from the rate of natural increase in 1957, indicating either that
the war had no effect on population or had a paradoxical effect. One must note, however,
that the sources indicate the estimates by the governments of Vietnam are either unreliable
or of unknown completeness.
A. Paradigm Applied: Vietnam
Determining the intent to commit genocide is often problematic in
the absence of written authorization. The unstated objectives of actors, in
this case the United States and the Government of South Vietnam
(GVN), are difficult if not impossible to determine. As a result, before
addressing the criteria of intent, one might ask whether a prima facie case
for genocide can be made on evidentiary grounds alone - that is,
whether intent can be inferred from the pattern of killings.
Much of the data used comes from Guenter Lewy's citation of
sources in his defense of the United States' role in Vietnam."3 Lewy's
work, though explicit in its aims, has been noted for its exceptional schol-
arship by critics who have nevertheless disagreed with his assumptions
and conclusions due to its lack of censorship of sources that allows read-
ers to arrive at their own conclusions from the data presented."
The first charge brought is the killing of group members in whole or
in part. This corresponds to propositions one and two of the paradigm.
43. GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM (1978).
44. M.W. Browne, Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1978, at 9; Michael Walzer, Book
Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1978, at 9; William F. Buckley, Jr., N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Dec. 7, 1978, at 19 (Buckley wrote that "[t]he unfortunate Lewy, trying so hard to defend
our war as lawful, has unwittingly written one of the most damning indictments yet of
American intervention in Vietnam.").
1993 GENOCIDE
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
No one questions that there was a sustained attack by the United States
and the GVN that killed hundreds of thousands of people. Nor is there
any question that these attacks were authorized by the military and polit-
ical hierarchy of the United States.
However, Sartre and most other critics failed to note that both sides
were responsible for civilian casualties due in part to their targeted kill-
ings of non-combatants."5 These targeted killings included an estimated
36,725 persons in South Vietnam assassinated by the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese Army between 1957-1972."' Pike argued that the killing of
local officials, the "natural leaders" of Vietnamese society, "by any defini-
tion ... amounts to genocide.
'47
This is but one of the many accusations of genocide in that war. For
instance, Operation Phoenix, a Central Intelligence Agency program con-
ducted by the GVN and up to 650 U.S. military and civilian advisors to
"neutralize" the Vietcong infrastructure, killed an estimated 20,587 South
Vietnamese without trial between 1968-1971." 8 During the same period,
Pike estimated that the Vietcong and the Army of North Vietnam assas-
sinated about 21,115 Vietnamese.49
Lewy purports to demonstrate that Operation Phoenix was not an
assassination program because suspects were killed in the course of re-
sisting arrest or during military operations. He argues that the operation
was instead a counter-insurgency program designed to capture and inter-
rogate suspected Vietcong." The confusion in the press partly emanated
from the use by United States intelligence staff of the word "neutralize"
to include both suspects captured, interrogated, and later released as well
as suspects who were killed. The fact that up to thirty-nine percent of
those suspects were killed belies Lewy's defense. 1 Conceding that be-
tween "January 1970 and March 1971 less than 6 percent of those killed
(2 percent of all those neutralized) were killed as a result of special
targeting" means that 623 persons were targeted and assassinated, and an
additional 9,758 persons who should have been released were caught dur-
ing military operations and experienced extrajudicial executions.2 "Con-
cern over the increase in the number killed" - from sixteen percent of
reported cases in 1968 to thirty nine percent of reported cases in 1971 -
led the United States Military Assistance Command to issue new instruc-
tions to United States advisors in 1969 and 1970 about the constraints of
law; these instructions forbade assassinations.5 "
45. SARTRE, supra note 5.
46. DOUGLAS PIKE, THE VIETCONG STRATEGY OF TERROR 82 (1970).
47. Id. at 248.
48. LEWY, supra note 43, at 281.
49. PIKE, supra note 46, at 454.
50. Id. at 279-285.
51. LEwv, supra note 43, at 281.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 282-283, 496 n.38.
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According to estimates by the United States of "civilian casualties
resulting from enemy-initiated incidents - assassinations, the mining of
roads, the shelling of hamlets or refugee camps, etc.. ." - the number of
deaths represents thirty-one percent of the 53,730 civilians estimated to
have been "killed outright" during 1969 and 1970.1" All such estimates
arouse suspicion because of their false precision and the possible bias ac-
tivating the source, whether estimating casualties inflicted by their own
forces or by their enemies. While the magnitude of casualties inflicted by
North Vietnam and the Vietcong is significant, the preponderance of ci-
vilian casualties were inflicted by the United States Army or United
States trained forces.
Propositions three and four ask whether the Vietnamese were se-
lected as indiscriminate or categorical victims regardless of what they did.
Sartre's charge that United States troops were engaged in "indiscriminate
shooting, murder, rape, and looting" implies that there was a lack of se-
lection of victims between North and South Vietnamese and therefore an
explicit or implicit authorization for slaughter." Two types of charges ex-
ist in South Vietnam: 1) acts by individual soldiers of murder, rape, etc.;
and 2) the conduct of the war itself - massive bombardment, the use of
anti-personnel weapons, and deportations to strategic hamlets and refu-
gee camps, which Sartre termed "concentration. camps."56
Before examining the inference of intent, the following questions
must be answered: What evidence was there of authorization for any
crimes committed by individual servicemen? Conversely, what evidence
was there that such crimes elicited punishment?
Regarding acts by individual soldiers and units, there is insufficient
evidence available from the scattered testimonies compiled by the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal convened by Bertrand Russell in 1967 to
make a case.5 7 The selective concern of that tribunal, however, was
faulted by some antiwar activists, including Staughton Lynd who did not
join the Tribunal because it would not investigate the war crimes of both
sides. Finally, in 1969 Bertrand Russell "completely broke with
Schoenman [the principal investigator of the tribunal] having
concluded that the latter had an 'utter incapacity of imparting
reliable information' and was suffering from megalomania." 8 Telford
Taylor, a severe critic of the United States' policy, noted that the United
States massacre at Son My, better known as the My Lai massacre, "pales
into numerical insignificance beside the massacre of thousands in Hue
during the Tet offensive, when the Vietcong also overran Quang Ngai and
54. Id. at 448-449.
55. SARTRE SUPRA note 5, at 73.
56. Id.
57. AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL (John Duffet ed., 1970). The Tribunal accepted the Sartre essay as its judgment
on genocide. See SARTRE, supra note 5.
58. LEwy, supra note 43, at 313.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
raced through the hospital shooting doctors, nurses, and bed-ridden pa-
tients."" This does not bear on the evidence for charges against the
United States, but it does bear on imputations that the United States is
alone responsible for the totality of killings of unarmed Vietnamese.
Question one of the paradigm examines whether the United States
had in place sanctions for or against murder, other violations of life-integ-
rity, war crimes, and genocide. Evidence indicating that there were sanc-
tions and enforcement mechanisms to protect the lives and human rights
of Vietnamese from violations by United States servicemen include two
actions undertaken by the United States. First, American officers and ser-
vicemen were prosecuted for their roles in the massacre at Son My, which
was exposed by a member of the United States armed forces. Second, 288
soldiers and marines were tried and court-martialed for personal crimes
against Vietnamese, including murder, rape, mutilation of corpses, and
negligent homicide.6 0 Therefore murder, including mass murder, was still
recognized as murder during the war in Vietnam.
However, questions remain whether such 'crimes were reported and
whether enforcement mechanisms were consistently employed. For in-
stance, company commanders were involved in some cases with abetting,
failing to report, or concealing war crimes. The rules for reporting, refor-
mulated after the Calley trial, probably encouraged cover-ups since
soldiers were supposed to report war crimes to their commanding officer.
Lewy concludes that "[w]hatever the reasons, it is apparent that the rules
for reporting war crimes were often violated."'" The issue is whether vio-
lations of the rules were deviations or the norm. Judgment on this issue
depends on whether the very conduct of the war -such as the designa-
tion of "free-fire zones" for bombing, which accounted for the greatest
number of casualties - constituted a war crime or lead to a general atti-
tude among American servicemen of diminished value for Vietnamese
lives.
Proposition five explores the issue whether there was premeditated
intent and sanctions for genocide implicit in the conduct of the war itself.
What evidence is there of sanctions for attack on Vietnamese civilians?
The United States Rules of Engagement (ROE) proscribed firing on
populated areas except when there was organized resistance from the
Vietcong, not just sniper fire. "In an instruction program established in
1965, newly arrived soldiers were taught that respect for civilian life was
not only a matter of basic decency and legality but was also essential for
winning the hearts and minds of the people."6 2
Both American commanders and members of the United States
59. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 171 (1971).
60. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, My LAI 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1971).
61. LEWY, supra note 43, at 347.
62. Id. at 302.
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armed forces grumbled and resented General William Westmoreland's ex-
plication of the ROE in 1965-66. They resented the limitations on bomb-
ing, which might have prevented casualties among United States soldiers,
and the clearance procedures necessary before artillery fire and air strikes
could be authorized. The ROE were denounced in the Congressional Rec-
ord by Senator Barry Goldwater in June 1975.63 Civilians were supposed
to be warned of impending air raids by leafletting and loudspeakers. But
these orders were not widely known among field commanders and were
interpreted inconsistently. Further, American combat troops were not ad-
equately trained concerning the Geneva Conventions protecting
civilians."
Jonathan Schell concluded that the ROE were utterly ineffective in
protecting the civilian population. 5 Lewy notes that "Prof. Telford Tay-
lor, formerly chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg war
crimes trials and a critic of many facets of the United States' Vietnam
policy, has called the rules of engagement 'virtually impeccable.' "66 But
Lewy omits what Taylor went on to say:
But of course the question remains whether the picture painted by
these directives bears any resemblance to the face of war in Vietnam.
... Of what use is an hour or two of lectures on the Geneva Conven-
tions if the soldier sent into combat sees them flouted on every side?
How does the admonition to the Air Force square with the observa-
tions of Jonathan Schell on the way in which tactical air power is ac-
tually used, or with the Marine 'ultimatum' that he quotes? How 'real'
do the instructions to the ground troops appear in the light of the
lieutenants' testimony at the Duffy trial, of the 'mere gook' rule de-
scribed by the Army lawyers, or of the Army Major's remarks after
the destruction of Ben Tre, with heavy loss of civilian life: 'It was
necessary to destroy the town to save it?'67
The "mere gook" rule refers to the belief by many soldiers "that the
lives of Vietnamese were cheap and not protected by the laws of war."6"
"Free fire zones" or "specified strike zones" (SSZ) where the civilian pop-
ulation was supposed to have been warned to move and/or transferred
could be bombed with fewer inhibitions than other areas in which the
Vietcong were believed to be operating. But the targets were supposed to
conform to the laws of war in the SSZs also, with specific targets being
chosen by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) who were in a better position
to see the targets than were the bombers."
All these assumptions were often negated in fact. For instance, civil-
63. Id. at 303.
64. Id. at 235-239.
65. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE OTHER HALF 151 (1968).
66. LEwY, supra note 43, at 233.
67. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 168-169.
68. LEWY, supra note 43, at 241.
69. Id.
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ians often moved back to their homes rather than remaining in the SSZs.
In addition, Richard Miller charged that the FAC's sometimes called
strikes against the wrong targets, prompted in one case by paid
Vietnamese informers who targeted a Jesuit mission that refused to put
up the NLF flag.70
This pattern of anticipatable deaths that were not prevented because
of the strategy and tactics chosen, the inadequate specification, communi-
cations, and lack of consistent enforcement of norms against war crimes
certainly could, and did, elicit charges of war crimes and immoral conduct
of the war."' However, to make a prima facie case for genocide, we have to
return to the question of selection of victims before exploring the ques-
tion of American intent.
Propositions three and four ask whether the Vietnamese victims were
selected because they were Vietnamese and whether they were in fact de-
fenseless victims. Most South Vietnamese civilian victims were not se-
lected. Rather they were killed as a result of the following United States
strategies: high firepower; reprisals for suspected VC-NVA fire in order to
defeat the Vietcong and to protect American soldiers; officially dividing
the population into "loyal" and "disloyal" camps; and instigating the vil-
lagers to deny aid to the Vietcong and expel them out of fear of repri-
sals. 72 The South Vietnamese villagers were vulnerable in most cases be-
cause of where they were, not who they were. They were also vulnerable
because Vietcong strategy made their villages into "defended places" and
because the Vietcong used villagers to launch attacks, leading to the le-
gally-rationalized erosion of protective norms by the United States in the
face of military frustration.
According to Lewy's estimate of how civilian deaths were related to
military deaths in the Vietnam conflict, between 365,000 and 587,000
North and South Vietnamese civilians were killed by all forces. These
dead constitute either twenty-eight or forty-five percent of all deaths, de-
pending on the assumptions one makes about the ratio of combatants to
noncombatants among the United States' reported war deaths.7 3 Other
figures compiled by AID, Lewy, and Senator Kennedy's Senate Subcom-
mittee on Refugees state the highest estimate of civilian deaths attributa-
ble to all forces as 430,000.4 This constitutes 1.7 percent of the popula-
tion of both Vietnams in 1960, about the same percentage of civilians
70. RICHARD MILLER, THE LAW OF WAR 192 (1975).
71. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 59.
72. LEWY, supra note 43, at 95-107, 271-374; WALZER, supra note 11, at 188-189. If the
number of Vietnamese who were murdered by US serviceman who were subsequently in-
dicted were added to the number of Vietnamese killed in Operation Phoenix, the ration of
the total number of Vietnamese killed to the number murdered and subject to extrajudicial
execution by GVN forces is 11.45:1. Estimates used to arrive at this figure include 542 mur-
dered Vietnamese where an indictment resulted out of 430,000 total number of Vietnamese
killed. This figure comes from the Kennedy Committee's estimate.
73. LEWy, supra note 43, at 452-453.
74. Id.
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killed in the two world wars in this century and in the Korean conflict.
The estimate of civilian deaths is not inconsistent with the vague es-
timate supplied by the Permanent Mission of Vietnam to the United
States that "several hundred thousand" were killed in "Southern Viet-
nam"; no estimate was made for "Northern Vietnam." ' Paradoxically, we
find unexpected population growth during this period (see Table 1), indi-
cating perhaps that the original population may have been higher than
estimated and the percent killed less than estimated. The number of
Vietnamese wounded is not known. However, the Kennedy Committee
estimated that 1,005,000 Vietnamese civilians were wounded, and the offi-
cial Vietnamese source reports there are 302,000 war invalids in "south-
ern Vietnam," presumably including civilians and combatants.7 6
Estimates of internal refugees, officially recorded and temporarily
displaced or unrecorded, range from 4.5 million South Vietnamese to ten
million in "Southern Vietnam."' 7 This raises the question whether the
South Vietnamese who were defenseless victims had any choices when
they were unable or unwilling to fight for either side and were unable to
expel either the Vietcong or the United States. Was there an alternative
that would allow them to evade being killed? Sartre charges that the al-
ternatives presented to the South Vietnamese constituted "conditional
genocide," for there were no alternatives other than to "U]oin the armed
forces of Saigon or be enclosed in . . .concentration camps. '7 8 Such op-
tions, he asserts, were an example of "deliberately inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about [the] physical destruction [of the
Vietnamese] in whole or in part. 7 9
Question two in the paradigm examines whether the United States
deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the phys-
ical destruction of the South Vietnamese. The refugee camps did not lead
to the physical destruction of the internees but preserved them from
physical destruction. However, Sartre makes a case by dwelling on the
demoralization and impairment of the social structure as a result of dis-
placement and destruction of the traditional Vietnamese way of life. He
also charges that the refugee camps prevented births through the separa-
tion of families, shown as charge 1(d) in Table 1. Sartre characterizes the
camps by their lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, separation of families,
the lack of any activities for the refugees, and destruction of family and
social structures."
Many concur with his judgment of poor conditions in the camps.
Lewy cites reports supporting most of Sartre's charges but asserts that
the conditions, although "generally dismal," were "not out of line with
75. SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 101-103 (1990) [hereinafter VIETNAMI.
76. LEwy, supra note 43, at 445-449.
77. Id. at 108; VIETNAM, supra note 75, at 101.
78. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 72-73.
79. Id. at 74.
80. Id. at 73-75.
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the local standard of living and with what one could expect in a wartime
situation.""1 Taylor ascribes the failure of the United States to insure
that the camps met with basic standards to a more general cause, "un-
dermaintenance." The commitment by the United States to social ser-
vices was never commensurate with the need in Vietnam and was only a
small proportion of the total spent on the war." However, Sartre's model
of the Nazi concentration camp, an institution designed for calculated de-
struction, simply does not fit. In contrast to concentration camps in which
people disappear and are systematically tortured and worked to death,
the South Vietnamese camps were shelters for refugees displaced from
their homes but not denied legal existence. These refugees were not sub-
jected to military discipline, forced labor, or torture.
The Russell Tribunal also charged that the camps were purposely
placed in dangerous zones but gave no evidence of how sites were se-
lected."3 This charge, however, underlines the danger that justified the
existence of the camps and of strategic hamlets, a danger which arose
from the strategy employed by both sides. The camps were justified by
the United States intervenors because they were required by their obliga-
tion to protect the civilian population from physical destruction. Thus, it
is difficult to infer from the deficiencies of the camps that they consti-
tuted deliberate infliction on the group of "conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part," as defined by Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention.
Further, some unplanned consequences of camp life, such as depen-
dency, demoralization, and changes in family structure, occur in many
refugee camps and administered communities and cannot be plausibly in-
terpreted as physical destruction. Neither Sartre nor anyone else has
shown how the camps and strategic hamlets led to physical destruction or
a diminishing birth rate. In fact, as Table 1 points out, the population of
Vietnam actually increased during the war years.
There are questions about any population transfers by an occupier or
an intervenor under international law, but the removal of the civilian
population is not prohibited by the Geneva Convention if undertaken for
the security of the occupied population. Article 49 of the Geneva Conven-
tion states that
[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of pro-
tected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupy-
ing Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohib-
ited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power
may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the secur-
ity of the population or imperative military reasons so demand...
Charge 1(b) in Table 1 explores whether the United States deliber-
81. LEWY, supra note 43, at 228.
82. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 196-202.
83. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 48-50.
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ately caused "serious bodily and mental harm" to destroy the Vietnamese
as a group. This charge, brought by the Russell Tribunal, alleged as evi-
dence the effects of the use of fragmentation bombs - showing the "in-
tention of accomplishing a greater massacre," which is a war crime84
and incendiary weapons, such as napalm and white phosphorous.
However, there is an alternative explanation to the use of such weap-
ons. Lewy explains that incendiary weapons, including napalm, do not
violate the Hague Convention because the Convention has been inter-
preted to weigh civilian suffering relative to military effectiveness, and
interpretation which only negates the use of weapons that cause suffering
but are militarily ineffective.8 5 Lewy observes that napalm was used in
World War II and Korea, but this argument is partially outdated by re-
strictions on incendiary weapons in Protocol I of 1977. The tactical justi-
fication of incendiary weapons used by both sides is their usefulness in
killing enemy forces in underground bunkers. Although the use of napalm
is not outlawed in attacks on combatants, international norms may be
changing. A 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution con-
demned the use of napalm without any dissenting votes and declared that
incendiary weapons, like bacteriological, chemical, and nuclear weapons,
should be outlawed.
8 6
Lewy further concludes that cluster or fragmentation bombs (CBUs)
have legitimate military functions. Lewy observes that "CBUs proved
particularly useful in flak suppression over North Vietnam where they
could either knock out the anti-aircraft weapons or prevent them from
firing by forcing their crews underground."8 Taylor also argues that anti-
personnel bombs might have had legitimate uses in North Vietnam.8
However, there are serious questions about the proportionality of civilian
casualties such weapons inflict. Krepon criticizes the lack of military con-
sideration of the high civilian casualties caused by the CBUs and advo-
cates new protocols to the Geneva Convention banning their use, despite
their effectiveness at suppressing flak.
A Japanese team of experts traveling in North Vietnam and observing
the effects has estimated that a single CBU dropped in a linear pat-
tern and detonated at an altitude of 600 feet was able to disperse its
fragments so as to kill or wound people at an effective range of 300
meters by 1,000 meters. A report by the International Committee of
the Red Cross places the correct figure at 300 by 900 meters. These
figures are generally halved by American experts (noting the possible
bias of the sources) .... CBUs, by literally pockmarking an entire
area, could either knock out the anti-aircraft weapon or prevent it
from firing, thus providing the maximum amount of cover for U.S.
84. Id. at 20-22.
85. LEWy, supra note 43, at 242-43.
86. Id. at 247-48.
87. Id. at 267.
88. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 141-142.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
aircraft, surpassing even napalm in effectiveness. 9
Article 35 of Protocol I in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Ge-
neva Convention prohibits "the use of any weapon the primary effect of
which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detec-
tion by X-Rays."90 Although the use of napalm and fragmentation bombs
was not unlawful at the time, it seems likely that many of their uses
would now be regarded as war crimes.
The destruction of crops and other methods of defoliation may be
construed as the deliberate infliction of "conditions of life calculated to
bring about [the] physical destruction [of the Vietnamese] in whole or in
part," conditions which could lead to charges of genocide.91 Crop destruc-
tion, applied to 3.2% of South Vietnam's cultivated land between 1965
and 1971, was said to affect less than one percent of the population in
areas where food was destroyed, according to Lewy.92 However, a policy
that indirectly curtailed food to the civilian population in those areas
might violate the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention outlawing
starvation of the civilian population. 3
Defoliation was intended to clear jungle and forest terrain so troops
could operate more effectively. Neither objective is outlawed by the laws
of war nor were these tactics calculated to bring about the physical de-
struction of the Vietnamese. However, the program undermined the exis-
tence of the estimated 325,000 villagers involved by 1967, then 1.9% of
the estimated population of South Vietnam. Cutting the local food supply
led to widespread hatred of the United States and the GVN among the
villagers, and a Rand Corporation study in 1967 recommended that the
program be discontinued as it was counterproductive. 4 It continued for
four more years, due to resistance on the part of the American military
command, which commissioned its own reviews.5 The chemical agents
employed to defoliate the jungle were intended to protect the soldiers of
the United States. At the time, the long term effects of the agents were
not known. When the research on the long-range, harmful effects of
Agent Orange on people was established, its use was suspended. 6 Chemi-
cal despoliation of the environment has since been prohibited by Protocol
I of 1977 Geneva Convention.
7
Charge 2 in the table accuses the United States of intending to de-
89. MICHAEL KREPON, Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster Bombs, in
4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONCLUDING PHASE 269 (Richard A. Falk
ed., 1976).
90. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 23, at 405, 409.
91. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 74.
92. LEWY, supra note 43, at 258.
93. See supra note 23.
94. LEwY, supra note 43, at 259-260.
95. Id. at 260-262.
96. Id. at 263.
97. MCCOUBREY, supra note 19, at 117-118.
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stroy the Vietnamese people. As already established, there was a sus-
tained attack by United States and GVN forces that led to widespread
displacement of and the death of a segment of the Vietnamese people -
perhaps less than two percent - and the wounding of perhaps three
times that number. 8 The victims most often became vulnerable as a re-
sult of a military strategy that increasingly led to patterned deviations
from the Rules of Engagement, which were designed to protect
Vietnamese civilians. Yet the United States tried and punished perpetra-
tors of individual murders and of the Son My massacre of Vietnamese
civilians. No evidence of other wanton massacres was confirmed, despite
claims by some soldiers that war crimes and torture were commonplace in
Vietnam." Further, no evidence was presented that the South
Vietnamese regarded the United States intervention as a threat to their
right to life, as opposed to their self-determination or their political au-
tonomy. The major refugee flows from Vietnam were instigated by the
postwar governments: first, in 1975 by the military victory of North Viet-
nam; and second, in 1978-80 by the policy of the new government of
pressing ethnic Chinese Vietnamese to flee in boats under conditions that
threatened their survival.100
The effects of the war on the Vietnamese are scarcely summed up in
the second portion of the table. It omits the wounded, the destruction of
traditional ways of life, the ecological damage, and the post-war refugee
flows. In addition, there was probably widespread social disorganization
and adaptation to ways of life scorned by the Vietnamese, including pros-
titution and mixed marriages. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam lists
"several hundred thousand prostitutes and drug addicts" as war damage
in Southern Vietnam and 800,000 orphans or children abandoned by de-
parting American soldiers.10 1
Although no prima facie case can be made for genocide under the
Genocide Convention, thereby rendering the question of genocidal intent
moot, there still remains the question of intent for the indiscriminate kill-
ing that did occur. No one has presented evidence of a United States ide-
ology justifying destruction of the Vietnamese qua Vietnamese. On the
contrary, official explanations endorsed the United States obligations to
guarantee the rights of the South Vietnamese. One approach in showing
intent is to infer motives from the attitude of United States servicemen in
South Vietnam towards the Vietnamese. Widespread racism, depersonal-
ization, hostility, and cultural misunderstanding were reported. The
Vietnamese were demeaned, dehumanized, and excluded from the Ameri-
can universe of obligation by labeling them "gooks," as the Koreans were
98. See supra notes 72-74.
99. LEwy, supra note 43, at 313-319.
100. HELEN FEIN, CONGREGATIONAL SPONSORS OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THE U.S.,
1979-1981 44-47 (1987); BARRY WAIN, THE REFUSED: THE AGONY OF THE INDOCHINESE REFU-
GEES (1981).
101. VIETNAM, supra note 75, at 101.
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labeled in the Korean War. But the attitudes of American soldiers were a
product of the specific situation. No evidence was presented that such
attitudes precipitated American involvement or determined the conduct
of the war. To blame the enlistees and draftees, who did not choose either
to fight the war or the strategy that led them to construe all Vietnamese
as possible enemies, would diminish the responsibility of the architects of
American policy.
Another approach to explain the mass civilian deaths is to analyze
the political and military decisions that led to the destruction. Bedau ex-
amines Sartre's case for genocide and the possible methods of establish-
ing intent and exposes Sartre's contradictory statements." 2 "Sartre some-
what grudgingly admits that there is no evidence of a self-conscious
United States policy in Vietnam to kill Vietnamese 'merely because they
are Vietnamese.' "103 But, Sartre argues that "genocidal intent is implicit
in the facts." He asserted that the United States would have to extermi-
nate part of the Vietnamese in order to show "all of the Third World...
that guerrilla war does not pay."10 However, both Thompson and Lans-
dale, counter-insurgency experts who worked in Malaya and the Philip-
pines where their strategies succeeded, testified that anti-guerrilla war-
fare does not require mass killing, but it does require patience, respect for
the rural population, and discrimination of guerrillas from the peasantry
or villagers.10 5 Both Thompson and Lansdale advised the United States
on strategy in Vietnam in the early 1960's.
Bedau maintains that
the war the United States actually fought in South Vietnam beginning
in 1965 was, by and large, not conducted on any recognizable theory
of counter-insurgency at all. The war, insofar as we are concerned
with those events ... with possibly genocidal significance, was actually
fought as a function of responses to considerations progressively in-
compatible with the patience and persistence required by anti-guer-
rilla warfare."'0 6
In other words, the United States relied on air power because of the need
to keep American casualties low for domestic political reasons. This strat-
egy led to a war of attrition, designed to destroy Vietcong support by
stripping away their protective layer of villagers and driving the villagers
into refugee camps to escape bombardment. But after 1968, when the
United States realized it could only win by devastating South Vietnam, it
began to scale the war down.1"' Bedau concludes that genocidal intent by
102. See BEDAU, supra note 5.
103. Id. at 32.
104. Id. at 19.
105. See generally ROBERT THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENcY: THE LES-
SONS OF MALAYA AND VIETNAM (1966); EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE, IN THE MIDST OF WARS: AN
AMERICAN'S MISSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1972).
106. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 36.
107. Id. at 37-42.
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the U.S. was not proven, but he implies that war crimes and crimes
against humanity may have been perpetrated by the United States in
Vietnam.
10 8
Walzer reaches a similar conclusion, observing that an appropriate
anti-guerrilla strategy, which requires a very high ratio of soldiers to guer-
rillas, does not lead to indiscriminate killing of civilians. However, this
sort of anti-guerrilla strategy was not used in Vietnam.' Walzer declares
that "the American war in Vietnam was, first of all, an unjustified inter-
vention, and it was, secondly, carried on in so brutal a manner that even
had it initially been defensible, it would have to be condemned."" Tay-
lor, a partisan of the intervention until 1965 by his own account, con-
demns the choice of a strategy that could not work and that produced
mass deaths for expedient reasons, as well as the lack of adequate funding
for restitution and social and medical services in Vietnam."' He con-
cludes that General Westmoreland and his staff were guilty of war crimes
in Vietnam, citing Nuremburg precedents." 2
Miller concludes further that South Vietnamese civilians were denied
the protection of international law by all parties - the United States, the
GVN, the Vietcong and the army of North Vietnam - and that the
bombing of the North was a war crime but not genocide." 3 Taylor dis-
agreed, on the other hand, concluding that there was ". . . no sufficient
basis for war crimes charges based on the bombing of North Vietnam."
He believed that General Westmoreland and the United States Army
command were indictable for war crimes, but he was not sure who in
Washington was indictable for their actions regarding South Vietnam." 4
Lewy, who generally defends the conduct of the Vietnam war against crit-
ics, also concludes that General Westmoreland could be indicted for fail-
ure to prevent war crimes because of his failure to enforce the Rules of
Engagement, "a dereliction which in turn led to war crimes."".5
B. Paradigm Applied: Afghanistan
Again, application of the paradigm begins by examining the evidence
of possible genocidal acts in Afghanistan to determine whether a prima
facie case exists, as alleged in charges 1(a) and 1(b). Propositions one and
two examine the killing of members of groups in whole or in part, the
causing of serious bodily or mental harm, and the existence of a sustained
attack by an organized political actor.
All sources agree that the destruction of crops, orchards, irrigation,
108. Id. at 43, 46.
109. WALZER, supra note 11, at 193-94.
110. Id. at 299.
111. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 172-207.
112. Id. at 179-82.
113. Id. at 157-200, 306.
114. Id. at 192-94.
115. LEWY, supra note 43, at 241-42.
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and terracing systems without limits demonstrates a sustained and mas-
sive bombing against Afghan villages and agriculture.11 6 This could be at-
tributed to a Soviet strategy intended to destroy the subsistence of the
mujahadeen, a legitimate military objective. However, since the anticipat-
able result is the starvation of the civilian rural cultivators, the attack
may be considered a war crime under the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Convention.117 Rubin observes that there is "evidence that the destruc-
tion of agriculture has created pre-famine conditions in certain regions of
the country . .. [and] infant mortality, always high, has skyrocketed to
300 to 400 per thousand." 1 8 If this destruction was aimed at military
objectives, then the bombing might be considered a war crime, but it is
insufficient evidence to make a prima facie case for genocide.
Proposition three examines whether the victims were selected by
their membership in a group. Soviet soldiers perpetrated repeated indis-
criminate massacres of Afghans. Two dozen incidents of corroborated re-
ports are cited by Laber and Rubin as representative of a pattern of mas-
sacres." 9 In these incidents, the soldiers entered villages without
opposition and slaughtered people by many means, including lobbing gre-
nades into houses; tying, dousing with gasoline, and setting victims afire;
setting fire to irrigation tunnels; and bayonetting and machine gunning
victims.2 0 Victims were apparently picked solely because they were Af-
ghans, demonstrated by the lack of evidence of any interrogation or
search process.
Rubin observes that "the Soviets have a clear and consistent policy
of taking reprisals against civilians for military actions by the Resis-
tance."'' Bodansky, relying on the history of Soviet military doctrine,
strategy, and the reports of defectors, asserts that the attacks on villagers
were purposeful and represented "simply a pragmatic and highly effective
tactic" both to punish resistance and "to create collateral terror to pro-
duce a massive flight of refugees."' 22 Other acts described below also indi-
cate that the Soviet intent was to murder and maim.
Proposition five examines whether the Soviets had a premeditated
116. HELSINKI WATCH, To DIE IN AFGHANISTAN (1985)[hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH
1985]; HELSINKI WATCH, "TEARS, BLOOD AND CRIES:" HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE
THE INVASION 1979-1984 (1984)[hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH 1984]; JERI LASER & BARNETT
R. RUBIN, "A NATION Is DYING;" AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE SOVIETS 1979-1987 (1988); see also
PORTER, supra note 3.
117. See supra note 23.
118. BARNETT R. RUBIN, Human Rights in Afghanistan, in AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT
GAME REVISITED 351 (Rosanne Klass ed., 1990) [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME
REVISITED.]
119. LABER & RUBIN, supra note 116, at 351.
120. See also HELSINKI WATCH 1984, supra note 116, at 34-40; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
AFGHANISTAN: UNLAWFUL KILLING AND TORTURE 5-6 (1988); GOODWIN, supra note 5, at 2.
121. RUBIN, supra note 118, at 340-341.
122. YOSSEF BODANSKY, Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan, in AFGHANISTAN:
THE GREAT GAME REVISITED, supra note 118, at 258.
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intent to murder and to inflict serious bodily harm without alternative
explanations. The bombardments that occurred appear to have been pur-
posefully aimed at crowds and aggregates of people unlikely to attack
soldiers, such as refugee caravans, weddings, funerals, religious gather-
ings, and civilian buses. Many reports show that victims and their fami-
lies tell of mines disguised as toys that they and their children picked
up.123 This tactic obviously serves to maim and disable people, but no one
has alleged that such mines have any military purpose' whatsoever in
fighting a guerrilla war since the design indicates that they target
children.
Charge 1(c) addresses the infliction of serious mental harm resulting
from sustained attacks. There are discrepancies in the reports of attacks
on the Afghans as a religious collectivity. Because many Afghans con-
ceived of the war as an Islamic war against communism, the mujahadeen
were literally warriors in a religious war. Reisman and Norchi observe
that Islam is of extraordinary importance to the identity of Afghans, and
this religious belief was a target of systematic attack during torture. They
believe that "[g]iven the Afghan value system, such acts could constitute
genocide [under] Article II (b), in that they are acts committed with the
intent to destroy a religious group by causing serious mental and physical
harm to members of the group." They note that "[tihere is also evidence
of the targeting of mosques and religious schools and, in one case, the
intentional desecration of a mosque."14
Laber and Rubin assert that "there have been no open
attacks on Islam." Instead, they claim that leaders of the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan ("DRA") tried to "woo religious Afghans to their
side" through public lip-service to Islam and manipulation of religious
schools by the secret police. Observance of Islam, they reported, under-
mined Afghans' chances of succeeding in school and gaining government
employment.1 25 At worst, however, giving preference to Afghans not prac-
ticing Islam and creating a system of positive incentives to ideological
conformity constituted a policy of discrimination rather than an attempt
to physically eliminate or injure religious practitioners. The Genocide
Convention's definition of harm would be stretched beyond usefulness if
it included all discrimination and ideological attacks as causes of "mental
harm." In addition, Reisman and Norchi's charge that mosques have been
purposefully targeted seems hard to prove given the evidence of indis-
criminate bombardment and the general targeting of crowds.
Charge 1(e) forbids the forcible transfer of children of the victimized
group to another group. Reisman and Norchi report that
[e]vidence indicates a co-ordinated policy of forcibly transferring chil-
dren from Afghanistan to the USSR. The objective of this policy ap-
123. See supra note 116; RUBIN, supra note 118, at 341, 355.
124. REISMAN & NoRCdI, supra note 5, at 5.
125. LABER'& RUBIN, supra note 116, at 121-22.
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pears to be a deliberate attempt to deculturate the transferred chil-
dren from the values of their parents and the group and to forcibly
inculcate them in the values of the Soviet Union. According to wit-
nesses, the procedure is as follows: without warning, officials enter a
classroom, and with no explanation, choose a certain number of chil-
dren who must leave with the officials . . . . Several days later, the





Helsinki Watch first reported this practice in 1984 and stressed its
systematic character in 1985.127 Government officials drew some students
from the Fatherland Training Centers, which were designed for the re-
education of orphans. Others were transferred without parental permis-
sion from youth organizations. Some parents were induced to give permis-
sion by force, deceit, and social pressure. 128 In some cases, children were
transferred for short term visits (up to six months). But in 1984, "Babrak
Karmal announced a new program under which thousands of children
would be sent to the Soviet Union for ten years of education. ' ' 29 Mem-
bers of the Communist Party, Khad (the DRA security service), and com-
munist youth organizations were induced to go, and children of the poor
and the fatherless were snatched. A defector from the Kabul government
asserted that there was an agreement signed between the Soviet Union
and the Afghan trade union organization to send at least 2,000 Afghan
children a year to the Soviet Union for ten years.'
Question one examines whether sanctions for murder, crime, and ge-
nocide were in place. As has been noted, the massacres "are invariably
the work of Soviet soldiers, sometimes accompanied by a few Afghan
party members who serve as guides."'' 1 In several instances, Soviet
soldiers are reported to have said that "[w]e don't need the people, we
need the land!' 32 Not only were there no sanctions against the mass kill-
ing of Afghans, individual homicides, rape, or looting, Soviet defectors
have said that there were sanctions against not killing civilians. For ex-
ample, Private Oleg Khlan told the Christian Science Monitor on 10 Au-
gust 1984 that "[w]e were ordered by our officers that when we attack a
village, not one person must be left alive to tell the tale. If we refuse to
carry out these orders, we get it in the neck ourselves."' s
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Inde-
pendent Council on International Human Rights reported on the human
rights situation in Afghanistan. The Independent Council observed that
126. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5, at 5-6.
127. HELSINKI WATCH 1985, supra note 116.
128. Id. at 71-78.
129. Id. at 76.
130. Id. at 78.
131. LABER & RUBIN, supra note 116, at 22.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 35.
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"the unremitting pattern of violations of the laws of war by Soviet forces
bespeaks [of] a complete lack of awareness of these basic international
norms, which the Soviet Union has bound itself by treaty to observe.1 ' 3 4
Bodansky relates the indiscriminate killing of civilians to a long-term So-
viet doctrine and strategy previously practiced in Asia.1' This compari-
son helps to explain the gap between international norms and the behav-
ior of the Soviet forces.
The effect of these policies has been severe. A Gallup Pakistan sur-
vey, designed and analyzed by a Swiss demographer, Marek Sliwinski,
showed that nine percent of Afghanistan's pre-war population was killed
between 1978 and 1987, another thirty-three percent have become refu-
gees, and eleven percent are internally displaced."3 6 The percentage
killed, Sliwinski notes, is among the highest in recent history.
Although comparing percentages killed cannot prove culpability, it
does suggest how the effects in Afghanistan compare to other instances of
genocide aimed at eliminating a people over time. For example, the per-
centage killed in Afghanistan, a figure that includes an unknown number
of combatants, is not far below the percentage of Poles killed by German
forces in Poland between 1939 and 1945, where ten percent of the Polish
population, excluding the Jews and combat deaths, was killed. Lemkin
identified Poles as the victims of Nazi genocide in his seminal work on
genocide."3 7 The Poles were directly killed in collective reprisals, mas-
sacres, and extra-judicial executions on streets and in villages, and indi-
rectly in concentration camps through starvation and medical experimen-
tation.' In Afghanistan, forty-six per cent of the Afghans killed were
victims of aerial bombardments, and Sliwinski estimates that "non-bel-
ligerents constituted approximately [eighty] percent of the victims of ae-
rial bombardment.' 39 This is an indirect testimony to either the target-
ing of civilians or indiscriminate targeting.
Human rights organizations have noted that there were violations of
the laws of war on both sides. The Afghan government and the parties of
the resistance killed prisoners of war, and they committed extra-judicial
executions and torture both preceding the Soviet invasion and during the
war. '4 However, the violations committed by the resistance organizations
were generally directed against the DRA, Soviet soldiers, and rival resis-
tance groups, and not against unarmed Soviet citizens.
134. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5.
135. BODANSKY, supra note 122, at 234, 246-256.
136. MAREK SLIWINSKI, The Decimation of a People, 33 ORaIs 39 (1989).
137. See BOHDAN WYTWYCKY, THE OTHER HOLOCAUST: MANY CIRCLES OF HELL 39-52, 91
(1980)(discussing the similarity between the pattern of collective punishments in Afghani-
stan in which Soviet soldiers killed hundreds in reprisal for a single illegal act in the vicinity
and German collective punishment in Poland between 1939 and 1945).
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There is no evidence of any generalized sanctions among resistance
groups towards the murder of civilians, with the exception of the killing
of Afghan government officials believed to be collaborating with the oc-
cupiers. However, the practices of the various resistance groups differ
substantially. Most of the charges made by Helsinki Watch have been
leveled against the Islamic fundamentalist Hezb-e Islami Party.
Propositions four and five and Charge 2 explore whether the Soviet
Union intended to destroy the Afghans as a people. There is scarcely any
dispute about the facts except those concerning the Soviet attacks against
Islam. Reisman and Norchi conclude that both the acts and intent of the
Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were "to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national ... group, as such," and thus those
actions violate the Genocide Convention. The object of the mass bom-
bardments, massacres, and destruction of the countryside was the depop-
ulation of Afghanistan. The refugee flight figures show that this
succeeded.
Where actions with predictable results are taken over an extended pe-
riod of time, and the consequences of these actions regularly confirm
their outcome, one can reasonably infer that those responsible for
such actions are committing them with specific intent. [In legal terms
this proposition is res ipsa loquitur, or, the thing speaks for itself]....
There is considerable evidence that genocide was committed against
the Afghan people by the combined forces of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The repetition and pattern indi-
cates that many of the acts described above were part of a plan."'
Sliwinski shows that the ethnic composition of Afghanistan changed
significantly between 1978 and 1987. In 1978, Pathans were the largest
ethnic group, comprising thirty-nine percent of all Afghans. Yet, they
made up only twenty-two percent of the population in Afghanistan in
1987. Tajiks made up twenty-six percent of the population in 1978, but
grew to thirty-four percent of the population in 1987. Sliwinski observed
that
[tihe new dominance of Tajiks and other northern ethnic groups is of
more than mere ethnographic interest.... The proximity of the So-
viet Muslim republics populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens
provides the Soviet authorities with the linguistic and cultural means
to influence the now-dominant Afghan ethnic populations. At some
point, the strong linguistic and ethnic affinities across the Soviet-Af-
ghan border may even furnish a pretext for the annexation of these
provinces." 2
Sliwinski also notes that the depopulation of these provinces "resulted
from a conscious, ordered, and planned Soviet policy. . . These steps
could not be achieved without expelling or exterminating the indigenous
141. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5, at 6.




Similarly, the decline in the number of agriculturalists from eighty-
five percent in 1977/78 to twenty-six percent in 1986/87, coupled with the
fact that ninty-seven percent of the refugees were of rural origin
is probably not coincidental. The disintegration of agricultural com-
munities, traditionally hostile toward communism, constituted the
sine qua non for the stability of the communist regime. But, as offi-
cials in Kabul have been quoted as saying, 'if only 1 million people
were left in the country, they would be more than enough to start a
new society." '44
Thus, "depopulation" is not a voluntaristic or neutral process; rather,
it is a strategy for state security that utilizes genocide. An alternative in-
terpretation by Rubin argues that Soviet destruction was an outcome of
another goal.
The Soviet intention in invading Afghanistan and trying to subdue
the resistance was not to destroy any group, in whole or in part. Their
goal, rather, was to subdue armed opposition to a regime they had
imposed on the country. When it became clear, however, that the re-
sistance movement drew sustenance and strength from the support it
received from the population, the Soviet military did not shrink from
massive reprisals against civilians; this had the foreseeable effect of
destroying certain groups and depopulating certain areas.
14"
Rubin's explanation implies that the Soviet reprisals were a consequence
of mujahadeen resistance and a means to deter attacks by the resistance.
Rubin, however, observed that the Soviet reprisals were purposefully
targeted at civilians and not restricted to reprisals against the attackers
by targeting the villages in which attackers hid that could be considered
defended places."" This targeting could be considered a crime of war in
itself.
Afghans became victims regardless of whether they fled or surren-
dered. This is particularly reflected in the indiscriminate Soviet bombing
of refugee caravans and villages. Similarly, the victims of massacres were
not protected by their surrender to Soviet troops. Thus, the destruction
of Afghans was not incidental to military objectives but was a strategic
objective in and of itself. This objective fulfills what Bodansky sees as the
Soviet military doctrine and strategy of isolating and destroying segments
of a society in Muslim areas before attempting to pacify the remainder.
147
Rubin's denial that the Soviet/DRA destruction of a significant part
of the Afghan people is genocide appears to stem from a confusion be-
tween intent and motive. He defines intent as a long-range goal rather
143. Id. at 49-50.
144. Id. at 50-51.
145. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 7.
146. See supra note 119.
147. BODANSKY, supra note 122, at 234-37.
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than the expected end of purposeful action.1 4 8 However, motive and in-
tent are different. Motive describes why an action was taken; intent de-
scribes the anticipated goal or purpose of an action. Identical intents,
therefore, may be inspired by different motives. The intent to destroy the
Afghan people, without distinction between combatants and non-combat-
ants, was demonstrated by the persistent pattern of mass killing and
maiming of people in Afghanistan and the destruction of the environment
and food producing areas by the Soviet Union and the DRA. This pattern
is not attributable to the pursuit of any legitimate military objective and
is therefore a violation of sections a, b, and c of Article II of the Genocide
Convention. Furthermore, the forcible transfer of children is a clear viola-
tion of section e of Article II.
Although conclusions may be drawn about Soviet patterns of behav-
ior in Afghanistan, different interpretations of their motives cannot be
confirmed. The pattern discerned may be attributed to a motive to terror-
ize, to devastate, or to depopulate the nation. The specification of motive
lends plausibility to a finding of intent to commit genocide, assuming that
the facts fit the criteria of genocide. In that case, as Reisman and Norchi
argued, a plausible prima facie case of genocide can be made against the
Soviet Union and the DRA in Afghanistan for its action from 1979-1988.
VI. CONCLUSION
Genocide, some have said, is a "fuzzy concept. 1 4 9 Similarly, the laws
of war, "although a long-established reality with a substantial core of rec-
ognized practice, are very fuzzy around the edges. '150 The paradigm pro-
posed earlier provides the criteria necessary to make genocide easier to
detect and could be used as a model to devise criteria to probe the exis-
tence of war crimes. Such a paradigm might enable us to explore whether
lawful ends may lead to the killing of civilians and to clarify the inten-
tions of the perpetrators and the obligations of superior officers.
Sanctions for or against the murder of members of the occupied na-
tion by the intervenor provide clues both to the nature of the obligations
of occupiers and to the expectations officers have for actions of their
troops. If men are expected to kill members of a group categorically, it is
plausible to assume that their superiors would have to both exonerate the
perpetrator from punishment for the killing of the victims and to obligate
or compel them to kill. The existence of sanctions against murder, if they
are enforced, is inconsistent with the execution of genocide. The fact that
American soldiers were prosecuted for individual murders in Vietnam, as
well as for group massacres, whereas Soviet soldiers were threatened for
not participating in massacres in Afghanistan is a vital clue to the differ-
148. RUBIN, supra note 118, at 352, 335.
149. Quoting Professor Morton Winston at the Genocide Watch Conference of the In-
stitute for the Study of Genocide in New York City, May 22, 1989.
150. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 32.
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ence between the aims and strategies of the United States and the Soviet
Union. These differences, both in the scale and toleration of massacres
between Vietnam and Afghanistan, lead to the differential impact on
population noted in Table 1.
In Vietnam, there were repeated and substantive charges of war
crimes that appear well-founded. Charges of genocide, which gained some
currency at the time, simply are not supported by the acts cited. In Af-
ghanistan, there were repeated and substantive
charges of "depopulation," massacre, deliberate injury, forced transfer of
the children of Aghanis, and occasional charges of genocide, all of which
were usually ignored. The evidence of Soviet actions in Afghanistan sus-
tains a prima facie charge of genocide as well as charges of war crimes.
Mixed anti-guerrilla war and wars of intervention may provide prov-
ocations and justifications masking genocide for several reasons, but they
do not produce genocide without authorization for targeted mass killing
at some level. These reasons may include 1) labeling one camp or a whole
people as an enemy; 2) the inability of intervenors and state defenders to
reliably discriminate between guerrillas and others of the population they
come from; 3) the pre-existing racial/ethnic division between the inter-
venors and the population; 4) the greater force available to the interven-
ors; and 5) military strategies and ideologies that counter guerrilla strate-
gies of discrete and tactical terror by mass terror and intimidation.
There are, however, warning signs that genocide may be occurring.
Careful examination should be made of actions taken by the intervenors.
Is a group being labeled collectively? Do the doctrines of the intervenor
support the elimination of the group? Even if such clues are not present
at the beginning, the situation could change since military problems en-
countered by the intervenor may evoke the temptation to win by terror
and by depopulation of the countryside. Genocide is thus a temptation to
intervenors faced with guerrillas drawn from a majority population
among whom they can not readily discriminate, control, or segregate. It is
not, however, an inevitability.
Both to explain the different outcomes in Vietnam and Afghanistan
and to anticipate the possibilities of genocide elsewhere in the future, the
international community must look not only at the vulnerability of the
victims but at the vulnerability of the perpetrators as well. Some factors
to consider are the greater readiness of totalitarian states to use violence
and terror as opposed to democratic states, the integration or separation
of civilian and military power, and the distance between the society of the
victim from that of the perpetrator. Research on genocide since 1945 con-
firms that perpetrators are much more likely to be revolutionary and au-
thoritarian states than democratic states. 15 ' Democratic checks, including
151. BARBARA HABF, State Perpetrators of Mass Political Murder Since 1945,
presented to the Conference on State-Organized Terror at Michigan State University, No-
vember 2-5, 1988; see also Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and
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the power of public opinion, the division of powers, and a free press, were
among the factors that inhibited American escalation of the war in Viet-
nam. Conversely, the absence of democratic checks in the Soviet Union
was one of the factors that allowed that war, denounced in 1989 by many
in Moscow, to escalate to genocide.
Some Findings, 1 INT'L J. GRouP RIGHTS 79 (1993).
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